Sam Hou Fai elected as Macau Chief Executive

A high vote and the concern of the intensified political monopoly of the Macau establishment

On October 13, the 2024 Macau Chief Executive election was held and the results were announced on the same day. Sam Hou Fai, the only candidate in this election, was successfully elected with 98.99% of the votes, no opponents, and no opposition votes. On November 1, Sam Hou Fai was received by Chinese President Xi Jinping and was officially appointed as the sixth Chief Executive of Macau.

Compared with the previous Macau Chief Executives who were born and raised in Macau, Sam Hou Fai is not a native of Macau. He was born in mainland China in 1962, graduated from Peking University, and worked as a lawyer in mainland China. Before moving to Macau in 1986, Sam Hou Fai had been living in mainland China (not just born in mainland China). Of course, he has lived and worked in Macau for more than 30 years since then, and calls himself an "old Macau man", which can also be said to be well integrated into Macau and a "Macau man".

Sam Hou Fai is also a figure in the Macau establishment and has always been evaluated as a pro-mainland and pro-Chinese central government. After Macau returned to China at the end of 1999, Sam Hou Fai served as the President of the Macau Court of Final Appeal for a long time (similar to the Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court) until he ran for the Chief Executive in August this year. During his 25 years as the President, Sam Hou Fai made a series of judgments that were unfavorable to the pan-democratic camp in Macau and protected the Chinese central government and the Macau establishment. For example, in 2021, Sam Hou Fai and two other judges ruled to ban the June 4th rally of the Macau "Democratic Alliance", and quoted and followed the characterization of the June 4th incident as a "riot" by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of China in the judgment.

The election of such a figure as the Chief Executive of Macau means that the already powerful Macau establishment/pro-Beijing people will further completely monopolize the Macau political arena, and the already weak Macau democrats will be hit again, and their influence will approach zero.

Compared with Hong Kong, which has attracted much international attention and has been in turmoil before 2020, Macau is quite quiet and unknown. After the "December 3rd Incident" in 1966, the "Carnation Revolution" in Portugal in 1974, and the decolonization policy of the new Portuguese government, Macau has basically escaped from Portugal's control and is controlled by pro-Beijing forces. Macau is small in area and has a small population (only about one-tenth of Hong Kong's population). The local forces and democratic forces are very weak and unable to compete with Beijing. There was no large-scale turmoil when and before and after Macau's return in 1999, and the sovereignty was transferred very smoothly. In the 25 years since the return, there has been no major political turmoil in Macau.

The political arena in Macau afterwards, similar to Hong Kong, formed two major camps: the establishment and the pan-democratic camp. However, unlike the democratic camp in Hong Kong's public opinion, which dominated the Legislative Council, the democratic camp in Macau is far less powerful than the establishment camp. The ratio of the two sides in the Legislative Council election and other public opinion comparisons is about 2:8.

However, before 2020, the democratic camp in Macau was still relatively active despite its weakness. The pan-democratic forces in Macau, represented by the two political groups of "New Macau Society" and "New Hope", have criticized the government's policies and pointed out the current problems, and have a certain check and balance on the establishment. Among them, "New Macau Society" is the strongest among the democrats, and is more concerned about mainland affairs. It has also held many rallies to commemorate mainland democratic events. "New Hope" is more focused on safeguarding the local interests of Macau. Although the democrats in Macau are weak and restricted, they still "dance in shackles" and remain active.

However, with the changes in the situation in mainland China and neighboring Hong Kong, the narrow space that the democrats in Macau once had gradually disappeared. After the 2019-2020 Hong Kong anti-amendment movement was thwarted, the "Hong Kong National Security Law" was promulgated in 2020, the pan-democratic political parties and media in Hong Kong were banned one after another, and the political environment in Hong Kong changed dramatically, Macau was also greatly affected. Under the combination of soft and hard tactics, the democrats also experienced the closure of media and the suspension of party groups. In the 2021 Macau Legislative Council election, many democrats were disqualified from running, which dealt a heavy blow to the democrats. In 2022, Macau revised the "Macau National Security Law", strengthening the scope and intensity of the crackdown on "endangering national security", and the "tightening curse" on the heads of the democrats became tighter.

The establishment, which has always dominated Macau's political arena, has become more stable in its rule. After Macau's return, the four chief executives were all from the establishment and were elected with high votes. Among the 33 members of the Macau Legislative Council, only 14 seats were directly elected, and the non-directly elected seats were all taken by the establishment, and most of the seats in the direct election also belonged to the establishment. The Hong Kong judiciary is even more monopolized by the establishment, and Sam Ho Fai is a representative of the establishment in the judicial sector.

Compared with other native Macau establishment figures, Sam Ho Fai, as a mainland Chinese-born establishment figure, is more loyal and close to Beijing. This means that the localism and independence of Macau's authorities will be weakened, and their unity with the Chinese government will be strengthened. The promise and principle of "Macau people governing Macau" since the return to the motherland has also been shaken. Macau's uniqueness compared to mainland China may also fade. Some people's concerns about Macau's partial "mainlandization" and loss of regional characteristics are not groundless. In recent years, some changes in Hong Kong's politics and society and its move closer to the mainland have also verified the concerns of Macau people.

Compared with the indigenous establishment, the semi-foreign establishment such as Sam Ho Fai will be more like mainland bureaucrats in their governing style. They may be less tolerant of dissent and more indifferent to democracy. They may also be more dismissive of civil rights and public opinion. In recent years, the political atmosphere in mainland China has been repressive and the regime has increasingly tightened its control over society. Whether it is Hong Kong or Macau, pro-Beijing officials may partially copy mainland policies and create an atmosphere similar to that of the mainland.

This is obviously not good news for the Macao Special Administrative Region and its people. Although security and stability are very important to Macau, social vitality, diversity and democracy are equally important to Macau. If there is a lack of diversity in society and politics, and people's reasonable demands cannot be expressed independently and without risk, all forms of corruption, abuse of power, and foolish policies will appear.

For example, in recent years, Hong Kong has suppressed the opposition and labeled those who criticize the government as "endangering national security", resulting in a lack of supervision and restraint by the government and serious abuse of power. Even the establishment figure Chen Jingxin complained that government civil servants over-enforced the law and over-fined vulnerable groups such as taxi drivers and grandparents. Another establishment figure, Legislative Council member Xie Weijun, was reprimanded by Chief Executive Li Jiachao for criticizing the government's excessive enforcement and excessive fines. If Macau's democracy further shrinks and the establishment's political monopoly intensifies, what happened in Hong Kong will also happen in Macau. This is obviously not a good trend and is worrying.

Compared with Hong Kong, where the government has some reasons to be wary of the opposition and worry about subversion due to the anti-amendment movement and violence, Macau has been relatively stable for a long time. Even when the Macau democrats were more active, they expressed dissent in a peaceful and orderly manner. The Macau democrats are weak and it is difficult to threaten the regime's rule. But Beijing still does not tolerate this and hopes to control Macau more directly. This also means that the "one country, two systems" and "high degree of autonomy" policies promised by the Communist Party of China during the Deng Xiaoping era and implemented to a certain extent during the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao eras are not only in name only in Hong Kong, but also heading for extinction in Macau. If there are no major beneficial changes in Chinese politics in the future, Hong Kong and Macau will gradually become highly similar to the mainland. Even if there are still differences on the surface, there is no fundamental difference.

Although China's official policies are unlikely to change, the author still has some suggestions here. The author hopes that if the Chinese central government, Macau's ruling party and the establishment can be more tolerant and tolerate the diversity of society and the existence of political dissent, and act as necessary and beneficial supervisors, competitors and collaborators, and encourage the establishment to be more honest and dedicated, then there is nothing better.

Maintaining Macau's uniqueness relative to the mainland is also more conducive to giving full play to its special advantages, becoming an important bridge for exchanges between mainland China and the outside world, and a model for the coexistence of multiple cultures. This is also in line with the spirit of Macau's "Basic Law", beneficial to the interests of all sectors in Macau, and beneficial to the mutually beneficial relationship between mainland China and Macau.